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Abstract
By Solovay’s celebrated completeness result [31] on formal provabil-
ity we know that the provability logic GL describes exactly all provable
structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory
with a decidable axiomatisation. Japaridze generalised this result in [22]
by considering a polymodal version GLP of GL with modalities [n] for
each natural number n referring to ever increasing notions of provability.
Modern treatments of GLP tend to interpret the [n] provability notion
as “provable in a base theory T together with all true Π0n formulas as or-
acles”. In this paper we generalise this interpretation into the transfinite.
In order to do so, a main difficulty to overcome is to generalise the syn-
tactical characterisations of the oracle formulas of complexity Π0n to the
hyper-arithmetical hierarchy. The paper exploits the fact that provabil-
ity is Σ01 complete and that similar results hold for stronger provability
notions. As such, the oracle sentences to define provability at level α will
recursively be taken to be consistency statements at lower levels: prov-
ability through provability whence the name of the paper.
The paper proves soundness and completeness for the proposed in-
terpretation for a wide class of theories; namely for any theory that can
formalise the recursion described above and that has some further very
natural properties. Some remarks are provided on how the recursion can
be formalised into second order arithmetic and on lowering the proof-
theoretical strength of these systems of second order arithmetic.
1 Introduction
As mentioned in the abstract, by Solovay’s celebrated completeness result [31] on
provability we know that the provability logic GL describes exactly all provable
structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory with a
decidable axiomatisation. Japaridze generalised this result in [22] by considering
a polymodal version GLP of GL with modalities [n] for each natural number n
referring to ever increasing notions of provability.
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Japaridze considered an arithmetical interpretation of the logic GLP where
the [n] referred to a natural formalisation of “provable over the base theory T
using at most n nested applications of the ω-rule”. Beklemishev introduced in
[6] the logics GLPΛ that are like GLP only that they now include a sequence of
provability predicates [α] of ever increasing strength for each ordinal α below
some fixed ordinal Λ. In [17] the authors generalised Japaridze’s result into the
transfinite by providing an interpretation of GLPΛ for recursive Λ into second
order arithmetic by allowing for [α] at most α nestings of the omega rule, thereby
providing a first arithmetical interpretation of GLPΛ for Λ > ω. In a recent
paper ([9]) Beklemishev and Pakhomov provide an alternative interpretation in
first order arithmetic enriched with a collection of ever more expressive truth
predicates indexed by the ordinals.
Modern treatments of GLPω tend to interpret the [n] provability notion as
“provable in a base theory T together with all true Π0n formulas”. Let us call
this the truth-interpretation here. The main reason for the popularity of the
truth-interpretation is that the resulting provability hierarchies run in phase
with the arithmetical hierarchy and they imply good preservation properties
between different consistency statements giving rise to the so-called reduction
property. In particular, due to these good properties Beklemishev was able to
set GLPω to work to perform proof-theoretical analyses of Peano Arithmetic and
its kin ([3, 4, 5]). Below we shall give more circumstantial evidence to why the
truth interpretation is optimal.
As mentioned, the first arithmetical interpretation of transfinite polymodal
provability logic ([17]) was, like Japaridze’s original approach, based on iterating
applications of the omega rule. Although it was observed in [23] that soundness
of the interpretation is sufficient for the purpose of an ordinal analysis, the paper
also contained a completeness proof in such general lines that it can be applied
to a wide range of interpretations.
It seemed however, that the omega-rule interpretation does not have all
the desirable properties to make it directly a useful tool for ordinal analyses.
Even though various known fragments of second order arithmetic like ATR0,
Π11 − CA0 and Π
1
1 − CA0 + Bar Induction can be characterised ([10, 13]) in
terms of reflection principles using versions of the omega rule interpretation of
GLPΛ, the fine-structure between various consistency statements could not be
proven.
One possible reason may be that the omega provability predicates do not tie
up with the arithmetical hierarchy and Turing jumps as observed in [24, Lemma
9]. A more concrete and serious objection is given in an unpublished simple
observation from Ferna´ndez Duque: using only one application of the omega-
rule one can prove any induction axiom so that the one-consistency of primitive
recursive arithmetic in the omega-rule sense suffices to prove the consistency of
Peano arithmetic.
In short, the truth interpretation of GLPω has better properties than the
omega-rule interpretation. However, one advantage of the omega-rule interpre-
tation is its amenability to transfinite generalisations. The formalisation of the
truth interpretation relies on a syntactical characterisation of the arithmetical
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hierarchy in terms of the Σ0n formulas. It remained unclear how to generalise this
in a canonical way to the hyperarithmetical setting or beyond without extending
the language in a way that often seems rather ad-hoc.
The idea of this paper to overcome this is very simple yet turns out to be
rather powerful. The Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington theorem (FGH) tells us
that for a wide range of theories, in a sense, the canonical consistency predicate
is Π01 complete. Thus, instead of using a true Π
0
1 sentence as oracle for the
[1]T provability predicate in the truth interpretation, one can use a provably
equivalent consistency statement.
Via a generalisation of the FGH theorem proven in [24, 26] one can see that
the consistency notion corresponding to [1] provability is in a sense Π02 complete
and so on. Thus, it makes sense to consider the following recursion as in [24]:
provability at level n means provable from an oracle which is a consistency
statement of level m for some m < n. It feels like lifting oneself up from the
swamp by pulling ones hairs as the Baron von Mu¨nchhausen did. Moreover,
the recursion lends itself to an easy transfinite generalisation and that is exactly
what this paper does. Before we close the introduction with an overview of how
the current paper does so, we would like to point out how this paper fits in the
landscape of related literature thereby trying to provide an ample justification
for it.
Ordinal analysis via polymodal provability logics seems to have various ben-
efits over other methods of ordinal analysis. An important benefit is it allows
to tell different incomplete theories apart at the lowest possible level of Π01 sen-
tences. It is good to recall that the classical Π11 proof theoretical ordinal will
not even discern theories at the level of Σ11-level. Another benefit may seem the
modularity of ordinal analysis: the ordinal analysis of different theories will all
share the same template and re-use various tools and theorems.
We see another stronghold in the fact that the approach relates various
different fields in a natural way. In particular, the closed formulas of GLP–
called worms– are important in this. Worms can be used to denote various
notions central to foundational issues. For one, they are simple and well-behaved
elements from a well-behaved logic. Even though the logic GLP is known to be
PSPACE-complete ([29]) it is Kripke incomplete. However, natural topological
semantics do exist ([20, 21, 8, 12, 1]) even though it is known to depend on
strong cardinal assumptions for various natural topological spaces [2].
Moreover, the closed fragment of GLPΛ is very well behaved, well studied
and in particular does allow for natural relational semantics [21, 14, 15]. In
addition, and this provides a second interpretation of worms, the worms are
known to define a well-ordered relation as studied in [6, 7, 16] and thus can
provide for ordinal notation systems ([6, 18, 11]).
Some simple worms are just consistency statements which are known to be
related to reflection principles so that by classical results they are related to frag-
ments of arithmetic [27]. Thus, worms –apart from being privileged elements of
a decidable logic– can denote both ordinals and fragments of arithmetic. A pos-
sibly more important use however lies in their relation to Turing progressions:
each Turing progression below ε0 can be approximated by the arithmetical in-
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terpretation of a GLPω worm. The relation goes even that far so that points in
a universal modal model for the closed fragment of GLPω can be seen as arith-
metical theories axiomatised by Turing progressions ([25]) so that the model
displays all conservation results between the different theories. It is these four
different possible denotations for worms that make them so versatile and make
new interpretations of GLPΛ as the current paper so promising.
Plan of the paper Section 2 provides some useful lemmata and settles on
notation which otherwise is quite standard so that it can be skipped by the
initiate readers only to come back to it when needed. Then, in Section 3 the
central provability notion of this paper is introduced: one-Mu¨nchhausen prov-
ability. The usage of the word “one” in there refers to the fact that provability
at level α is allowed to use a single oracle sentence of a lower level consistency
statement.
Section 4 mainly dwells on the fact that in general we can not prove that
different Mu¨nchhausen provability predicates are provably equivalent even if
they are so on the low levels. It is observed that we do have uniqueness in case
the object theory and the meta theory are provably the same.
Section 5 then proceeds to prove soundness for one-Mu¨nchhausen provability
for a large class of theories and Section 6 proves arithmetical completeness. In
Section 7 it is sketched how one-Mu¨nchhausen provability can be formalised in
second order arithmetic. The formalisation requires a substantial amount of
transfinte induction both in the object and meta theory so that applications to
ordinal analysis will become difficult. Finally, in Section 8 some first steps are
taken on how to weaken the needed strength of the object and meta theory.
By allowing for multiple oracles sentences instead of just one, soundness can be
proven without any transfinite induction.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we dwell succinctly on the necessary notions from both formal
arithmetic and modal provability logics. Apart from proving a few new obser-
vations, we mainly settle on notation and refer to the literature for details.
2.1 Arithmetic
This paper deals with interpretations of transfinite provability logic. Even
though the set-up of such interpretations starts schematically so that our anal-
ysis applies to a wide range of theories, we will in particular have second or-
der arithmetic in mind. We refer the reader to standard references for details
([30, 19, 5]) and only include some minimal comments for expository purposes.
For first-order arithmetic, we shall work with theories with identity in the
language {0, 1, exp,+, ·, <} of arithmetic where exp denotes the unary function
x 7→ 2x. We define ∆00 = Σ
0
0 = Π
0
0 formulas (also referred to as elementary
formulas) as those where all quantifiers occur bounded, that is we only allow
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quantifiers of the form ∀x<t or ∃x<t where t is some term not containing
x. We inductively define Π0n+1/Σ
0
n+1 formulas as allowing a block of univer-
sal/existential quantifiers up-front a Σ0n/Π
0
n formula. The union of these classes
is called the arithmetical formulas and denoted by Π0ω.
If P is a predicate, the classes relativized to P are defined the same with
the sole difference that we consider the predicate P as an atomic formula. We
flag relativisation by including the predicate in brackets after the class like, for
example, in Π01(P ).
Peano Arithmetic (PA) contains the basic axioms describing the non-logical
symbols together with induction formulas Iϕ for any formula ϕ where as always
Iϕ := ϕ(0)∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+1))→ ∀xϕ(x). When Γ is a complexity class, by
IΓ we denote the theory which is like PA except that induction is restricted to
formulas in Γ. The theory I∆00 is also referred to as elementary arithmetic
1 or
Kalmar elementary arithmetic (EA).
In this paper we also mention collection axioms Bϕ which basically state that
the range of a function with finite domain is finite: Bϕ := ∀z<y ∃xϕ(z, x) →
∃u ∀z<y ∃x<uϕ(z, x). Again, for a formula class Γ, by BΓ we denote the set of
collection axioms for formulas from Γ.
Second order arithmetic is an extension of first order arithmetic where we
now add second order set variables together with a binary symbol ∈ for mem-
bership. Instead of extending identity to second order terms we stipulate that
second order identity is governed by extensionality: X = Y :⇔ ∀x (x ∈ X ↔
x ∈ Y ). The formula classes Σ1n and Π
1
n are defined as their first-order counter-
part only that we now count second order quantification alternations. Likewise,
by Π1ω we denote the class of all second order formulas.
The strength of various fragments of second order arithmetics is in large
determined by their set existence axioms. The collection axiom for ϕ tells us
that ϕ defines a set: ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ ϕ). The second order system ACA0
contains the defining axioms for the first-order non-logical symbols together
with set-induction 0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x∈X → x+1∈X)→ ∀x x∈X and collection for
all arithmetical formulas.
The theory ACA0 is conservative over PA for first-order formulas. In [17] the
system ECA0 is introduced as ACA0 except that comprehension is restricted to
∆00 formulas. In [10, Lemma 3.2] it is proven that ECA0 is conservative over
EA for first-order formulas.
We will tacitly assume that when we are given a theory T , we are actually
given a decidable formula τ that binumerates the axioms of T . That is to say,
χ is an axiom of T if and only if2 T ⊢ τ(χ). For each theory T we denote by T
the unary Σ01-predicate that defines provability in T . That is, N |= ϕ if and only
if ϕ is provable in T . When we write Tϕ(x˙) we denote the formula with free
variable x that expresses that for each number x, the formula ϕ(n) is provable in
T . Here, n denotes the numeral of n which is a syntactical expression denoting
1In the literature it is more common to work with a formulation of EA in the language
without exponentiation. For the purpose of this paper, the differences are not essential.
2We shall refrain from making a difference between syntactical objects and their Go¨del
numbers when the context allows us so.
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n, for example defined as 0 = 0;x+ 1 = x+ 1.
The Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington Theorem (FGH for short) states that for
any computably enumerable theory U , the corresponding formalised provability
predicate is provably Σ01-complete provided U is consistent. Since the theorem
provides an important tool in this paper, let us give a precise formulation.
Theorem 2.1 (Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington). Let U be a computably enu-
merable theory with corresponding provability predicate U . We have that for
any Σ01 formula σ(x), there is a Σ
0
1 formula ρ(x) so that
EA ⊢ ♦U⊤ → ∀x (σ(x)↔ Uρ(x˙)).
The theorem was given its name in [32] in acknowledgment to the intellectual
parents. Generalisations to other arithmetical provability predicates were stud-
ied in [24] and [26]. In particular, the quantification over Σ01 formulas (without
exponentiation however) can be made internal in EA and the ρ is obtained from
σ by means of an elementary function.
2.2 Transfinite provability logic
Even though via the FGH theorem the provability predicate T is in a sense Σ1
complete for a wide variety of theories, the provable structural behaviour of the
predicate can be described with well-behaved PSPACE decidable propositional
modal logics.
The simplest modal logics have one unary modal operator  which syntacti-
cally behaves like negation. The dual modality ♦ can be seen as an abbreviation
of ¬¬. The basic logicK is axiomatised by all propositional tautologies (in the
signature with ) and all so-called distribution axioms (A → B) → (A →
B). The rules of K are modus ponens and Necessitation: from A conclude
A.
The logic K4 arises by adding the transitivity axioms to K: A → A.
Go¨del Lo¨b’s logic GL arises to adding Lo¨b’s axiom scheme to K: (A →
A)→ A. It is known that GL is a proper extension of K4 and that it exactly
describes the provable structural properties of the provability predicate for a
wide range of theories.
In this paper we are interested in provability logics of a collection of prov-
ability predicates [α] of increasing strength indexed by ordinals α. For the finite
ordinals, this logic was discovered by Japaridze in [22]. We now present this
logic, which would be GLPω in our notation as given in the following definition.
Definition 2.2. For Λ an ordinal or the class of all ordinals, the logic GLPΛ is
given by the following axioms:
1. all propositional tautologies,
2. Distributivity: [ξ](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([ξ]ϕ→ [ξ]ψ) for all ξ < Λ,
3. Transitivity: [ξ]ϕ→ [ξ][ξ]ϕ for all ξ < Λ,
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4. Lo¨b: [ξ]([ξ]ϕ→ ϕ)→ [ξ]ϕ for all ξ < Λ,
5. Negative introspection: 〈ζ〉ϕ→ 〈ξ〉ϕ for ξ < ζ < Λ,
6. Monotonicity: 〈ξ〉ϕ→ [ζ] 〈ξ〉ϕ for ξ < ζ < Λ.
The rules are Modes Ponens and Necessitation for each modality:
ϕ
[ξ]ϕ
.
The following lemma is proven in [7].
Lemma 2.3. The logic GLPΛ is conservative over GLPΛ′ for Λ
′ < Λ.
The lemma is particularly useful in proofs where you only have access to rea-
soning up to GLP′Λ and tells you that any statement formulated in this fragment
can actually be proven there. We shall use this result throughout the paper,
mostly without explicit mention. Let us now prove some basic properties that
shall be needed later in the paper.
Lemma 2.4.
1. GLP ⊢ [α]〈β〉⊤ whenever α > β;
2. For α > β we have GLP ⊢ 〈α〉⊤ →
(
〈β〉ϕ↔ 〈α〉〈β〉ϕ
)
.
3. For α ≥ β > 0 we have GLP ⊢ 〈α〉⊤ →
(
〈β〉φ∨ψ
)
↔
(
〈β〉(φ∨ψ)
)
.
Proof. We reason in GLP.
For Item 1: If 〈β〉⊤, then [α]〈β〉⊤ by the negative introspection axiom. In
case [β]⊥ we get by an ex falso under the [β] modality that [β]〈β〉⊤ whence
[α]〈β〉⊤ by monotonicity.
For Item 2 we work under the assumption that 〈α〉⊤. From 〈β〉ϕ we get,
since β < α, that [α]〈β〉ϕ so from 〈α〉⊤ we get 〈α〉〈β〉ϕ. For the other direction,
from 〈α〉〈β〉ϕ we get by monotonicity that 〈β〉〈β〉ϕ whence by transitivity we
obtain the required 〈β〉ϕ.
For Item 3: We now work under the assumption that 〈α〉⊤. The only case
to consider in the → direction is when ψ holds. Then, ψ whence [α]ψ
which together with 〈α〉⊤ yields 〈α〉ψ whence 〈β〉(φ ∨ψ).
For the← direction we need to prove 〈β〉(φ∨ψ)→ 〈β〉φ∨ψ. So, suppose
〈β〉(φ ∨ ψ) and ¬ψ whence [β]¬ψ. But since 〈β〉(φ ∨ ψ) we must have
〈β〉φ and by weakening 〈β〉φ ∨ψ.
2.3 Transfinite induction and its kin
In various arguments we will have to prove that a statement ϕ holds for all
ordinals α. Often we will prove this by transfinite recursion on α. However,
in certain cases, transfinite induction is not available. In such cases there is a
technique called reflexive induction.
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The principle of reflexive induction can syntactically be seen as twice weaken-
ing regular transfinite induction. Recall that transfinite induction for a formula
ϕ is
TIϕ := ∀α(∀β<αϕ(β)→ ϕ(α)) → ∀αϕ(α).
and for a set of formulas Γ the principle TI(Γ) denotes the collection of all TIϕ
for ϕ ∈ Γ. As a first weakening one could consider the rule based version: from
T ⊢ ∀α(∀β<αϕ(β) → ϕ(α)), conclude T ⊢ ∀αϕ(α). Now, one can change the
antecendent to T ⊢ ∀α(T∀β<αϕ(β˙)→ ϕ(α)) to arrive at reflexive induction.
However, it turns out that by doing so, it has lost all its strength. That, is, the
resulting principle is provable in almost any theory:
Theorem 2.5 (Reflexive induction). Let T be any theory capable of coding
syntax. If T ⊢ ∀α
(
T (∀β < α˙ ϕ(β))→ ϕ(α)
)
, then T ⊢ ∀αϕ(α).
Although this principle is well known since Schmerl’s work ([28]) we include
a proof to emphasize that the principle actually does not rely at all on the fact
that < is a well-order. As a matter of fact, the proof goes through for any kind
of relation and basically boils down to an application of Lo¨b’s Theorem.
Proof. We shall see that from the assumption
T ⊢ ∀α
(
T (∀β<α˙ ϕ(β))→ ϕ(α)
)
we get T ⊢ T∀αϕ(α)→ ∀αϕ(α) so that the conclusion T ⊢ ∀αϕ(α) follows by
Lo¨b’s Theorem.
Thus, we reason in T , pick α arbitrary, we assumeT∀αϕ(α), or equivalently
T∀θϕ(θ), and set out to prove ϕ(α). But using T (∀β<α˙ ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α) in
the last step of the following reasoning, we clearly have
T∀θϕ(θ) → T∀θ∀β<θ ϕ(β)
→ ∀θT∀β<θ˙ ϕ(β)
→ T∀β<α˙ ϕ(β)
→ ϕ(α).
On occasion, in this paper we will have to combine regular transfinite in-
duction and reflexive induction. We call this amalgamate transfinite reflexive
induction.
Lemma 2.6 (Transfinite reflexive induction). Let T be a theory with a sufficient
amount of transfinite induction as specified below and let ≺ be a well-order in
T .
If
T ⊢ ∀α
(
∀β≺αϕ(β) ∧ T (∀β≺α˙ ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α)
)
,
then
T ⊢ ∀α ϕ(α).
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To prove transfinite reflexive induction for ϕ it suffices that T is capable of coding
syntax and proves transfinite induction for formulas of the form Tχ→ ϕ.
Proof. To start our proof we assume
T ⊢ ∀α
(
∀β≺αϕ(β) ∧ T (∀β≺α˙ ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α)
)
. (1)
We will prove by transfinite induction on α that
T ⊢ ∀α
(
T∀β≺α˙ ϕ(β)→ ϕ(α)
)
(2)
so that the result T ⊢ ∀αϕ(α) follows by reflexive induction (Lemma 2.5).
Proving (2) for α = 0 amounts to showing that T ⊢ ϕ(0) which follows directly
from (1).
For the inductive step, we reason in T , fix some α > 0, assume that
∀β≺α
(
T∀ γ≺β˙ ϕ(γ)→ ϕ(β)
)
(3)
and set out to prove
T∀ γ≺α˙ ϕ(γ)→ ϕ(α). (4)
To this end, we further assume that T∀ γ≺α˙ ϕ(γ), so that certainly we
have ∀β≺α T∀ γ≺β˙ ϕ(γ). Combining the latter with (3) yields ∀β≺α ϕ(β).
This, together with our assumption T∀ γ≺α˙ ϕ(γ) is the antecedent of (1) so
that we may conclude ϕ(α) which finishes the proof.
3 Theories for Single Oracle Mu¨nchhausen prov-
ability
Throughout this section, we fix some ordinal Λ and understand that all ordinals
denoted in this section are majorized by Λ.
3.1 Single Oracle Mu¨nchhausen provability
We are interested in theories T that can formalize a provability notion so that
provably in T the following recursion holds
[ζ]
Λ
Tφ :⇔ Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ<ζ (〈ξ〉
Λ
Tψ ∧ T (〈ξ〉
Λ
Tψ → φ)). (5)
Here, Tϕ will denote a standard predicate on the natural numbers express-
ing “the formula (with Go¨del number) ϕ is provable in the theory T ”. Further,
it is understood that 〈ξ〉ΛT stands for ¬[ξ]
Λ
T¬.
Rather than exposing a concrete theory where this recursion is formalizable
in a particular way and provable, we will define a class of theories that are able
to define and prove this recursion and have some additional desirable properties.
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Next we shall see which properties of the predicates [ζ]ΛT can be proven from
the mere recursion defined in (5). It will turn out that under some fairly general
conditions we can prove the collection of predicates [ζ]ΛT for ζ < Λ to provide a
sound interpretation for GLPΛ.
In Section 6 we shall see that by requiring slightly more on our predicate
and theory, this will give us arithmetical completeness.
In principle it would make sense to study (5) at a higher level of generality.
For example, T could be some version of set-theory allowing for uncountable Λ.
As long as (5) is provable together withs some additional conditions, most of
the results of this paper will carry over. It would be natural to require T to
be such that all GL theorems are schematically provable in T in such a setting.
3.2 Theories amenable for Single Oracle Mu¨nchhausen prov-
ability
For the sake of readability we shall often not distinguish between an ordinal
α < Γ, a notation for such an α or even an arithmetization of such a notation
for α. We shall however be explicit about the difference between the ordering
< on the ordinals and the arithmetization ≺ of this ordering on ordinals.
Definition 3.1. Let T be a theory and let Λ denote an ordinal equipped with a
representation in the language of T with corresponding represented ordering ≺.
For this representation, it is required that
T ⊢ “≺ is transitive, right-discrete and has a minimal element”,
T ⊢ (ξ ≺ ζ)→ [ζ]ΛT (ξ ≺ ζ),
ξ < ζ < Λ implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ.3
We call T a Single Oracle Λ-Mu¨nchhausen Theory –or a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen
Theory for short– whenever there is a binary predicate [ξ]ΛTϕ with free variables
ξ and ϕ so that
T ⊢ ∀ϕ ∀α≺Λ
(
[ζ]ΛTφ ↔ Tφ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ξ≺ζ (〈ξ〉
Λ
Tψ ∧ T ( 〈ξ〉
Λ
Tψ → φ) )
)
.
In this case, we call the binary predicate [ξ]ΛTϕ a corresponding 1-Mu¨nchhausen
provability predicate.
The “One” in “Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen Theory” refers to the fact that prov-
ability [ζ]ΛT at level ζ makes use of one single oracle sentence 〈ξ〉
Λ
Tψ. In Section
8 we shall see variations where we allow various oracle sentences to occur.
Often shall we simply drop the, or some of the indices of [ξ]ΛT like for example
in [ξ]Tϕ in case the ordinal Λ is clear from the context. To shorten nomenclature
further, we shall mostly simply speak of 1-Mu¨nchhausen theories and the corre-
sponding 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability. Often, when we speak of 1-Mu¨nchhausen
3This requirement can be dropped if we are happy with a soundness proof where all ordinals
are internally quantified. In this case we assume that each α < Γ has a natural representation
in T so that it makes sense to speak about the soundness of the necessitation rule.
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theories we implicitly assume that we have fixed some 1-Mu¨nchhausen provabil-
ity predicate [α]ϕ.
Observation 3.2. Since any 1-Mu¨nchhausen theory T proves that there is a
≺-minimal element, we shall use the notation 0 for this element even if the
natural number (or object) representing this minimal element is not the natural
number zero. Likewise, from right-discreteness we know that for any element
α ≺ Λ, there is a next bigger element that we shall suggestively call α + 1. In
analogy, we shall denote 0 + 1 by 1, 1 + 1 by 2, 2 + 1 by 3, etcetera.
The following observation is immediate.
Lemma 3.3. Let T be a Single Oracle Λ-Mu¨nchhausen Theory with correspond-
ing 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT . We have that
T ⊢ ∀ϕ ([0]ΛTϕ ↔ Tϕ).
When working with sound theories, we know that all the corresponding 1-
Mu¨nchhausen consistency statements are actually true:
Proposition 3.4. Let T be a sound Single Oracle Λ-Mu¨nchhausen Theory with
corresponding 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT . Then for each ξ ≺ Λ
we have N |= 〈ξ〉ΛT⊤.
Proof. By a simple case distinction. In case ξ = 0, we get from a hypothetical
N |= [0]T⊥ together with the soundness and the above lemma that N |= T⊥
so that T ⊢ ⊥ which cannot be.
In case ξ ≻ 0, suppose for a contradiction that N |= [ξ]T⊥. Then, using
soundness of T , we only need to consider the case that
N |= ∃ψ ∃ ζ≺ξ (〈ζ〉Tψ ∧T (〈ζ〉Tψ → ⊥)),
so that for some ordinal ζ ≺ ξ and some formula ψ we have N |= 〈ζ〉Tψ. Also
N |= T (〈ζ〉Tψ → ⊥) so that T ⊢ 〈ζ〉Tψ → ⊥ whence by soundness of T we see
that N |= ¬〈ζ〉Tψ which is a contradiction.
We note that the above argument does not use transfinite induction.
4 On uniqueness of Mu¨nchhausen provability
The definition of 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability allows for various different 1-Mu¨nchhausen
predicates to exist. Of course, it would be highly desirable that the defin-
ing equivalence (5) for 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability defined a T provably unique
predicate. We can prove uniqueness of the predicate via an external induction
up to any level below ω.
Lemma 4.1. Let T be a sound Single Oracle Λ-Mu¨nchhausen Theory for Λ ≥ ω,
with corresponding 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicates [α]ΛT and [α]
Λ
T . We
have for any natural number n that
T ⊢ ∀ϕ ([n]ΛTϕ ↔ [n]
Λ
Tϕ).
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Proof. We proceed by an external induction where the base case follow directly
from Lemma 3.3. We shall omit super and sub indices.
For the inductive step, we reason in T , fix some formula ϕ, fix the (n+1)th
element in the ≺ ordering and assume [n+1]ϕ. In the non-trivial case, there is
some formula ψ and an element m˜≺n+1 so that 〈m˜〉ψ and (〈m˜〉ψ → ϕ). Here
we end our reasoning inside T . Since we can prove that any element ≺-below
the externally given n + 1 is either the zero-th, or the first, or . . . or, the n-th
element, we know that m˜ corresponds to some natural numberm < n+1. Thus,
we can appeal to the external induction hypothesis that tells us that
T ⊢ ∀ψ ([m]ψ ↔ [m]ψ) (6)
and consequently
T ⊢ ∀ψ ([m]ψ ↔ [m]ψ). (7)
These two ingredients are sufficient to conclude [m]ψ. Of course the other
direction goes exactly the same.
Let us make some observations about this simple proof. First, we observe
that we could only conclude (7) from (6) by necessitation since the meta-theory
as in T ⊢ . . . is the same as the object-theory as in T . Second, we observe
that we only had access to the inductive hypothesis since we can express in the
language of first order logic that being smaller than the (n+1)th element implies
being equal to one of the zero-th, or . . . , or the nth element. Of course, we
cannot generalize this to the first limit ordinal and hence our external induction
cannot be extended to the transfinite.
If we wish to generalize our argument to the transfinite, we should replace
our external induction by an internal one. Of course, then in our meta-theory,
we should have access to transfinite induction. However, we only see how to
continue the proof in the case where the object theory equals the meta-theory
and consequently also has the same amount of transfinite induciton.
Lemma 4.2. Let T be a theory that proves the recursion from (5) for two pred-
icates [ζ]U and [ζ]U . We further suppose that T proves the basic facts about the
ordering 〈Λ,≺〉. Also, we assume that T proves transfinite Π1([α], [α]) induc-
tion.
If T and U are T -provably equivalent, then we have that [ζ]U and [ζ]U are
T -provably equivalent predicates.
Proof. We have chosen a formulation where T and U are different from the
outset so that we clearly see at what point we need to assume that T is T -
provably equivalent to U .
Thus, we reason in T and will as a first attempt prove by transfinite Π1([α], [α])
induction that
∀ζ ∀ϕ ([ζ]Uϕ ↔ [ζ]Uϕ).
For ζ = 0 the equivalence is obvious. Thus, we fix some ζ ≻ 0 and focus on
one implication the other being analogous. Thus, we assume that [ζ]Uϕ and set
out to prove [ζ]Uϕ.
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From the assumption [ζ]Uϕ we find –in the non-trivial case– some formula ψ
and ordinal ξ ≺ ζ so that 〈ξ〉Uψ and U (〈ξ〉Uψ → ϕ). The inductive hypothesis
now will tell us that 〈ξ〉Uψ ↔ 〈ξ〉Uψ.
However, there is no way that we know that this equivalence is provable, that
is, that we have U
(
〈ξ〉Uψ ↔ 〈ξ〉Uψ
)
. The latter would be needed to conclude
U (〈ξ〉Uψ → ϕ) so that [ζ]Uϕ.
The problem cannot be solved by strengthening the induction to for example
∀φ [ ([ζ]Uφ↔ [ζ]Uφ) ∧ U ([ζ˙]Uφ↔ [ζ˙]Uφ) ]
since then the problem will simply come back but now under a box.
However, when T = U we have access to transfinite reflexive induction as
formulated in Lemma 2.6. That is, in order to show that ∀ϕ ([ζ]Uϕ ↔ [ζ]Uϕ)
for a particular ζ we may assume both ∀ ξ≺ζ ∀ϕ ([ζ]Uϕ ↔ [ζ]Uϕ) and also
U (∀ ξ≺ζ˙ ∀ϕ ([ζ]Uϕ ↔ [ζ]Uϕ)) which makes that the proof now goes through
easily.
This lemma tells us that solutions to the recursion equivalence (5) need not
be provably unique if the object theory U is different from the meta theory T or
in case we do not have the sufficient amount of transfinite induction available.
Not having provably unique fixpoints need not necessarily be a big problem and
similar phenomena occur with for example Rosser fixpoints.
However, as we shall see in Section 5, we also need the object theory to
be equal to the meta theory if we wish to prove the soundness of GLPΛ with
respect to the [ζ]ΛU predicates. In particular, the arithmetical soundness of the
Necessitation rule requires the object and meta theory to be equal.
In case the object theory is not equal to the meta-theory, we can only prove
a weak form of uniqueness as expressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let T be a theory that proves the recursion expressed in equation
(5) for two predicates [ζ]U and [ζ]V with V possibly different from U . We fur-
ther suppose that T proves the basic facts about the ordering 〈Λ,≺〉. Also, we
assume that T proves transfinite Π1([α]U , [α]V ) induction. In case T proves the
arithmetical soundness of GLPΛ for both predicates [ζ]U and [ζ]V , then (omitting
subscripts)
T ⊢ ∀α≺Λ
(
(〈α〉⊤ ↔ 〈α〉⊤) −→ ∀ϕ∃ψ ([α]ϕ↔ [α]ψ)
)
.
Proof. We reason in T and proceed by a transfinite induction on α. Thus, we
assume the equi-consistency of both theories, fix some formula ϕ and assume
[α]ϕ. The case where [α]⊥ is trivial, so we assume 〈α〉⊤ whence also 〈α〉⊤.
Thus, in case ¬[α]ϕ we may by consistency use ψ = ⊥.
In case that [α]ϕ in virtue of Uϕ, we are done by the FGH theorem (The-
orem 2.1) for the theory V since Uϕ ∈ Σ
0
1. In the other case, there are β ≺ α
and χ so that 〈β〉χ and U (〈β〉χ → ϕ). By the IH we find some χ
′ so that
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〈β〉χ′ ↔ 〈β〉χ. Since we work under the assumption of 〈α〉⊤ and since the
provability predicates are sound for GLPΛ we also have 〈α〉 〈β〉χ
′ by Lemma
2.4.2 and, in particular ♦V 〈β〉χ
′. Since we now know the consistency of the
theory V + 〈β〉χ′ we may apply the FGH theorem to obtain a ψ with
U (〈β〉χ→ ϕ) ↔ V+〈β〉χ′ψ.
By the formalised deduction theorem we may conclude V (〈β〉χ
′ → ψ) whence
[α]ϕ↔ [α]ψ.
In this section we have shown that in general we cannot prove that 1-
Mu¨nchhausen provability predicates are uniquely defined by the recursion in
(5). Only in the finite ordinals can we prove uniqueness. This allows us to re-
late the provability notions from this paper to similar ones from the literature.
The most prominent example is given by the predicate
[n]TrueT ϕ which stands for ∃π∈Π
0
1
(
TrueΠ0
1
(π) ∧T (π → ϕ)
)
.
Furthermore, in [24] a reading is given where the modal operators [n]ϕ are
interpreted as follows.
[0]T φ := Tφ, and
[n+ 1]T φ := Tφ ∨ ∃ψ
∨
0≤m≤n
(
〈m〉T ψ ∧ (〈m〉

T ψ → φ)
)
. (8)
Soundness for this interpretation in PA was proven and a strong relation
was given to the truth provability predicates [n]TrueT . The next Lemma is a
strengthening on the one hand since we weaken the base theory to EA and a
weakening on the other hand since we only consider two modalities.
Lemma 4.4. Let T be a theory that contains EA. We have that
1. EA ⊢ ∀ϕ ([1]T ϕ↔ [1]
True
T ϕ);
2. GLP2 is sound for T when interpreting [0] as T and [1] as [1]

T ;
3. In case that moreover T proves the Σ01-collection principle we have
T ⊢ ∀ϕ∀ψ ∃χ ([1]T ϕ ∨ [1]

Tψ ↔ [1]

T χ).
Proof. It is easy to prove inside EA that [0]ϕ↔ ϕ (we omit the subscripts).
Likewise, [0]ϕ → [1]ϕ and [1]⊥ → [1]ϕ are easy to prove. With these
ingredients the first item easily follows: one direction is obvious since any oracle
sentence of the form ♦ψ is in Π01. The other direction is immediate in case
[0]⊥ and in the case 〈1〉⊤ it follows from the FGH theorem since under
the consistency assumption, any Π01 formula is equivalent and provably so to a
formula of the form ♦ψ.
The second item follows from the first since the statement holds for the
[n]TrueT provability predicates (see e.g. [5]).
The third item is implicit in [24] and explicitly stated and proven in [26] for
the [1]TrueT predicate which suffices by the first item of this lemma.
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Via an easy external induction we can prove that (8) and (5) define prov-
ably equivalent predices for all natural numbers. That is to say, if T is a 1-
Mu¨nchhausen theory, then for each natural number n we have that
T ⊢ ∀ϕ ([n]T ϕ↔ [n]
Λ
Tϕ) (9)
for any 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT . Moreover, in Lemma 4.1
we know that any 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT will be uniquely
defined up to ω. For later in the paper, we formulate the following corollary:
Corollary 4.5. Let T be a Λ-1-Mu¨nchhausen theory with Λ > 2 and corre-
sponding 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT . Moreover, let T contain
BΣ01.
1. GLP2 is sound for T when interpreting [0] as [0]
Λ
T and [1] as [1]
Λ
T ;
2. T ⊢ ∀ϕ∀ψ ∃χ ([1]ΛTϕ ∨ [1]
Λ
Tψ ↔ [1]
Λ
Tχ).
Proof. This follows directly from (9) and Lemma 4.4.
5 Arithmetical Soundness for One-Mu¨nchhausen
provability
In this section we will consider Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theories T and their cor-
responding Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicates for some fixed ordinal Λ
represented in T . We shall see that from the mere defining recursion on the
provability predicate we can obtain soundness of GLPΛ.
Many arguments in this section require transfinite induction. As we have
observed in Subsection ?? this means that the base theory should also prove a
decent amount of transfinite induction. In Section 8 we shall see how the need
of transfinite induction can be circumvented by slightly altering the defining
recursion.
Let us start the soundness proof by some basic observations that need very
little arithmetical strength to be proven. In particular, the following facts do
not require transfinite induction.
Lemma 5.1. Let T be a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding prov-
ability predicate [ξ]ΛT . We have the following.
1. T ⊢ ∀ξ ∀χ ([ξ]T⊥ → [ξ]Tχ) and more in general,
2. T ⊢ ∀ξ ∀ϕ, χ
(
[ξ]Tϕ ∧ T (ϕ→ χ)→ [ξ]Tχ
)
,
3. T ⊢ ∀ϕ∀ψ
(
[ξ]Tϕ ∧ Tψ → [ξ]T (ϕ ∧ ψ)
)
,
4. T ⊢ ∃x [ξ]Tϕ(x˙) → [ξ]T∃xϕ(x).
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Proof. Clearly, the first item follows from the second, so we reason in T and
assume [ξ]Tϕ. Thus, in the non-trivial case, for some ψ and for some ζ ≺ ξ
we have 〈ζ〉Tψ and T (〈ζ〉Tψ → ϕ). Clearly, since T (ϕ → χ), we have also
T (〈ζ〉Tψ → χ) so that [ξ]Tχ.
The third item follows from the second since in case of Tψ we also have
T (ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)).
The fourth item follows by an easy case distinction on ξ being zero or not
and both cases essentially follow from the fact that provably ∃xTϕ(x˙) →
T∃xϕ(x).
From our defining recursion (5), we get the axiom of negative introspection
and the axiom of monotonicity almost for free.
Lemma 5.2. Let ξ < ζ < Λ be ordinals in a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theory T .
We have
1. T ⊢ ∀ϕ (〈ξ〉Tϕ → [ζ]T 〈ξ〉Tϕ);
2. T ⊢ ∀ϕ ([ξ]Tϕ → [ζ]Tϕ);
Proof. Item 1 is immediate since T (〈ξ〉

T ϕ→ 〈ξ〉

T ϕ) using the fact that ξ < ζ
implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ. Likewise, Item 2 follows directly from the definition since
provably η ≺ ξ → η ≺ ζ (recall that we required that Mu¨nchhausen theories
prove the transitivity of ≺ and moreover, ξ < ζ implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ).
It is easy yet important to observe that we actually have a formalized version
of the previous lemma where we internally quantify over the ordinals. As such,
the formalized lemma can be used for example in an induction where possibly
non-standard ordinals are called upon.
Lemma 5.3. Let T be a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theory. We have
1. T ⊢ ∀ξ≺ζ≺Λ ∀ϕ (〈ξ〉Tϕ → [ζ]T 〈ξ〉Tϕ);
2. T ⊢ ∀ξ≺ζ≺Λ ∀ϕ ([ξ]Tϕ → [ζ]Tϕ);
These cross axioms are for many interpretations of GLPΛ actually the harder
axioms to prove sound. But in the Mu¨nchhausen interpretations they come
almost for free.
The above lemma can also be interpreted that any 1-Mu¨nchhausen prov-
ability predicate is monotone in the ordinal parameter. We note that it is not
trivial to see that the 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate is monotone in the
underlying base theory: Suppose that, for example we have a formulation of
elementary arithmetic and axiomatic set theory so that provably EA ⊂ ZFC.
This means that for any formula ϕ we have EAϕ→ ZFCϕ. Is it now easy to
see that we also have the expected [1]EAϕ→ [1]ZFCϕ?
Let us suppose that [1]EAϕ because of some 〈0〉EAψ with EA(〈0〉EAψ → ϕ).
A priori it is not at all clear how this information will yield us a ψ′ so that
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ZFC
(
〈0〉ZFCψ
′ → ϕ
)
and furthermore 〈0〉ZFCψ
′: where would we get so much
ZFC consistency strength from?4
At this point we can prove the soundness of the necessitation rule.
Lemma 5.4. Let T be a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding 1-
Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]ΛT . For any α ≺ Λ we have that if T ⊢ ϕ,
then T ⊢ [α]ΛTϕ.
Proof. We will only show ϕ
Tϕ
. This is sufficient since necessitation for larger
ordinals ϕ[α]Tϕ follows from the monotonicity of the predicate in α. But, as
always T ⊢ ϕ can be expressed as a Σ01 sentence which is true whence by Σ
0
1
completeness we get T ⊢ Tϕ.
We shall now prove the remaining GLP axioms to be sound. The following
lemma which was proven in [17], tells us that we don’t need to care about Lo¨b’s
axiom [ξ]([ξ]ϕ→ ϕ)→ [ξ]ϕ.
Lemma 5.5. Let GL denote the extension of GL with a new operator  and
the following axioms for all formulas φ, and ψ:
1. ⊢ φ→ φ,
2. ⊢ (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) and,
3. ⊢ φ→ φ.
Then, for all φ,
GL
 ⊢ (φ→ φ)→ φ.
Consequently, we only need to focus on the transitivity axioms [ξ]ϕ→ [ξ][ξ]ϕ
and distribution axioms [ξ](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([ξ]ϕ→ [ξ]ψ) in our soundness proof. It
is in this part where we need to assume that the object and meta theory are
equal so that we have access to transfinite reflexive induction as formulated in
Lemma 2.6.
Theorem 5.6. Let T be a Λ-One-Mu¨nchhausen theory and let [α]ΛT be a cor-
responding provability predicate. If T proves transfinite Π02([α]
Λ
T ) induction we
have that
1. T proves that all the rules and axioms of GLP are sound wr.t. T by inter-
preting [α] as [α]ΛT ; in particular
2. Distributivity: T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ∀ψ
(
[α]ΛT (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([α]
Λ
Tϕ→ [α]
Λ
Tψ)
)
;
4We have that ZFC is much stronger than EA, whence provably ♦EAχ → ZFC♦EAχ.
Consequently, in this particular example we could take ψ′ = ♦EAψ: in case ZFC⊥ we
trivially have ZFCϕ and ♦ZFC⊤ → (♦EAψ ↔ ♦ZFC♦EAψ). However, for general T ⊂ U we
cannot use the same formula ♦Tψ to guarantee [1]Tϕ→ [1]Uϕ.
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3. Closure under conjunctions:
T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ∀ψ
(
[α]ΛTϕ ∧ [α]
Λ
Tψ ↔ [α]
Λ
T (ϕ ∧ ψ)
)
;
4. Weak closure under disjunctions: T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ∀ψ ∃χ
(
[α]ΛTϕ ∨ [α]
Λ
Tψ ↔
[α]ΛTχ
)
;
5. Transitivity: T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ
(
[α]ΛTϕ→ [α]
Λ
T [α]
Λ
Tϕ
)
.
Proof. If we wish to prove Item 1, we should prove the soundness of the rules
and of the axioms.
As to the rules, the only rules of GLP are modus ponens and a necessitation
rule for each modality:
ϕ
[ξ]T ϕ
. As pointed out in Lemma 5.4 the soundness of
the necessitation rules follows from necessitation for T and by monotonicity,
Lemma 5.3. As always, the soundness of modus ponens is immediate.
In the remainder of our proof we shall thus focus on the axioms. Since we
proved the correctness of the negative introspection axioms – axioms of the form
〈β〉ϕ→ [α]〈β〉ϕ for β < α–and of the monotonicity axioms –axioms of the form
[β]ϕ → [α]ϕ for β < α– without any induction in Lemma 5.3 and since by
Lemma 5.5 we may disregard Lo¨b’s axiom, we set out to prove the remaining
axioms which are just the distribution and the transitivity axioms to complete
a proof of Item 1. In other words, to complete the proof of Item 1 we should
prove Items 2 and 5.
To prove that both items hold up to a certain level α < Λ we proceed by
an internal transfinite reflexive induction on α as expressed in Lemma 2.6. We
need to prove both items simultaneously since they depend on each other. As
a matter of fact, to get the proof going we will need to do some induction
building and prove Items 2 – 5 of the proof simultaneously by a transfinite
reflexive induction on α.
Thus, we will reason in T and shall mostly omit the subscript T and super-
script Λ in the remainder of this proof. The base case of the theorem is known
to hold via the soundness of GL and the FGH theorem.
For the reflexive inductive step, we are to prove our four items (Items 2 –
5) at level α assuming that we have access to all four items at any level β ≺ α
and we also have these four items under a regular provability predicate T at
any level β′ ≺ α. As we observed before, Item 1 at level α (soundness of GLPα)
follows directly from Items 2 – 5 for levels β ≺ α. Thus, we may in our inductive
step assume that we have access –and T -provably so– to all GLPα reasoning.
Let us thus focus on the first item to prove:
Item 3: ∀ϕ∀ψ
(
[α]ΛTϕ ∧ [α]
Λ
Tψ ↔ [α]
Λ
T (ϕ ∧ ψ)
)
. We fix some ϕ and ψ
and assume [α]ϕ and [α]ψ. We consider two cases. In the easy case, we have
that at least one of ϕ or ψ holds in which case the result directly follows
from Lemma 5.1.3.
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In the remaining case, by the recursion equation for [α], we find ordinals
β, β′ < α and some formulas ϕ′, ψ′ so that 〈β〉ϕ′, 〈β′〉ψ′, (〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ) and
(〈β′〉ψ′ → ψ).
We first remark that w.l.o.g. we may assume β′ = β. For, if e.g. β′ < β, then
by Lemma 2.4.2 we see that 〈β〉⊤ → (〈β′〉ψ′ ↔ 〈β〉〈β′〉ψ′) with 〈β〉ϕ′ → 〈β〉⊤.
Since we perform a transfinite reflexive induction, we also have our inductive
hypotheses under a  and in particular (〈β〉〈β′〉ψ′ → 〈β′〉ψ′). Thus, we see
that 〈β〉〈β′〉ψ′ ∧(〈β〉〈β′〉ψ′ → ψ) whence
∃ψ′′
(
〈β〉ψ′′ ∧(〈β〉ψ′′ → ψ)
)
.
So, we assume β′ = β < α, and by the inductive hypothesis (on Item 4), we
find χ with 〈β〉χ ↔ 〈β〉ϕ′∧〈β〉ψ′ whence by the reflexive induction hypothesis
also (〈β〉χ ↔ 〈β〉ϕ′ ∧ 〈β〉ψ′). Consequently, we have that (〈β〉χ → ϕ ∧ ψ)
and we are done with the direction [α]ϕ∧[α]ψ → [α](ϕ∧ψ). The other direction
follows directly from Lemma 5.1 since ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ) and ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ).
Item 2: ∀ϕ∀ψ
(
[α]ΛT (ϕ → ψ) → ([α]
Λ
Tϕ → [α]
Λ
Tψ)
)
. From the previous
item we know that
[α](ϕ→ ψ) ∧ [α]ϕ ↔ [α]
(
(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ϕ
)
so that the result follows from Lemma 5.1.
Item 4: ∀ϕ∀ψ ∃χ
(
[α]ΛTϕ ∨ [α]
Λ
Tψ ↔ [α]
Λ
Tχ
)
. We still reason in T and
assume that for some arbitrary ϕ and ψ we have [α]ϕ or [α]ψ. By Corollary
4.5 we may assume that α ≥ 2 (observe that our assumption that T proves
transfinite Π02([α]
Λ
T ) induction, implies that certainly T proves Σ
0
1 collection).
Under this assumption we make a case distinction.
In case that [α]⊥ we see by Lemma 5.1 that for any formula χ we have
[α]χ ↔ ([α]ϕ ∨ [α]ψ) so that equivalence certainly holds for the χ we propose
in the alternative case.
That is, we consider the case that 〈α〉⊤. We claim that under this assump-
tion, e.g. [α]ϕ is equivalent to the single ∃β≺α ∃ϕ′ (〈β〉ϕ′∧(〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ)). But
this is clear since by definition [α]ϕ is equivalent to
ϕ ∨ ∃β≺α ∃ϕ′ (〈β〉ϕ′ ∧(〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ))
so we only need to see that the first disjunct ϕ implies the second. But since
we work under the assumption that 〈α〉⊤, in particular, we have 〈β〉⊤ for any
ordinal β ≺ α. Moreover, for any such β we have that ϕ→ (〈β〉⊤ → ϕ) so
that the claim follows.
Using this observation, we find by unfolding the definition of 1-Mu¨nchhausen
provability in [α]ϕ ∨ [α]ψ some formulas ϕ′ and ψ′ and some ordinals β, β′ < α
so that
〈β〉ϕ′ ∧(〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ) or 〈β′〉ψ′ ∧(〈β′〉ψ′ → ψ). (10)
Since we work under the assumption that 〈α〉⊤ holds with α ≥ 2, we cer-
tainly have 〈max {β, β′, 1}〉⊤ so that as before we may and will assume without
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loss of generality that β′ = β and β ≥ 1. Using the distributivity laws we see
that (10) is equivalent to(
〈β〉ϕ′ ∨〈β〉ψ′
)
∧
(
〈β〉ϕ′ ∨ (〈β〉ψ′ → ψ)
)
∧
(
〈β〉ψ′ ∨ (〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ)
)
(11)
and,
(〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ) ∨ (〈β〉ψ′ → ψ). (12)
By the reflexive induction hypotheses and by Lemma 2.4.3 –by the inductive
hypothesis and Lemma 2.3 we may use any GLPβ reasoning– we see that (11)
can be written as a single diamond formula, say 〈β〉χ′. Thus, we would be done
if we can find some formula χ so that(
(〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ) ∨ (〈β〉ψ′ → ψ)
)
↔ (〈β〉χ′ → χ). (13)
We will find such a χ by applying the FGH theorem with base theory T + 〈β〉χ′.
It thus remains to see that this theory T + 〈β〉χ′ is consistent.
From 〈β〉χ′ we get by negative introspection (Lemma 5.3.1) that [α]〈β〉χ′.
Recall that we work under the assumption that 〈α〉⊤ so that by distributivity
at level α –which is already known at this stage in our proof– we get
〈α〉⊤ ∧ [α]〈β〉χ′ → 〈α〉〈β〉χ′
whence by monotonicity we get ♦〈β〉χ′ whence ♦T+〈β〉χ′⊤.
The existence of some χ so that (13) holds is now guaranteed by the (for-
malized) FGH theorem applied to the theory T + 〈β〉χ′ since
(〈n〉ϕ′ → ϕ) ∨ (〈n〉ψ′ → ψ) ∈ Σ01.
Item 5: ∀ϕ
(
[α]ΛTϕ → [α]
Λ
T [α]
Λ
Tϕ
)
. While reasoning in T we assume [α]ϕ
and only consider the non-trivial case. Thus, for some ϕ′ and some β ≺ α we get
〈β〉ϕ′ and (〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ). By negative introspection we get [α]〈β〉ϕ′. Since T is
a 1-Mu¨nchhausen theory it proves some properties of the order ≺. In particular,
from β ≺ α, we also get [α](β ≺ α). From (〈β〉ϕ′ → ϕ) we obtain by applying
successively provable Σ01 completeness and monotonicity that [α](〈β〉ϕ
′ → ϕ).
Since we already proved closure of the [α] predicate under conjunctions, we can
collect all the information under the [α] and applying Lemma 5.3.4 we see that
we have obtained [α][α]ϕ.
6 Completeness of Mu¨nchhausen provability
In this section we shall prove that under some modest set of extra assumptions,
we can obtain completeness of one-Mu¨nchhausen provability. Basically, this
section consist of invoking a result from [17] and recasting it in our context. Let
us first recall some definitions and results.
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6.1 Uniform proof and provability predicates
The definitions and results from this subsection all come from [17] where an
arithmetical completeness proof is given that is schematic in an abstract kind
of provability predicates. A first step in defining these provability predicates
consists of defining so-called Λ-uniform proof and provability predicates over T .
Definition 6.1. Let T be representable and Λ a linear order. Given a formula
π(c, λ, φ), we introduce the notation [c : λ]piφ = π(c, λ, φ), as well as [λ]piφ =
∃c[c : λ]piφ. The dual notions 〈c : λ〉piφ and 〈ξ〉piφ are defined as ¬π(c, λ,¬φ)
and ¬∃c[c : λ]pi¬φ respectively.
A Λ-uniform proof predicate over T is a formula π(c, λ, φ) (with all free
variables shown) satisfying
1. T ⊢ IΣ01(π);
2. T ⊢ ∀λ∀φ (Tφ→ [λ]piφ);
3. T ⊢ ∀λ∀φ∀ψ
(
[λ]pi(ψ → φ) ∧ [λ]piψ → [λ]piφ
)
;
4. T ⊢ ∀c ∀λ∀ξ≤Λλ∀φ
(
[c : ξ]piφ→ [c : λ]piφ
)
;
5. T ⊢ ∀c ∀λ∀φ
(
[c : λ]piφ→ [λ]pi[c˙ : λ˙]piφ˙
)
;
6. T ⊢ ∀c∀λ∀φ
(
〈c : λ〉piφ→ [λ]pi〈c˙ : λ˙〉piφ˙
)
;
7. T ⊢ ∀λ∀ ξ<Λλ∀φ
(
〈ξ〉piφ→ [λ]pi〈ξ˙〉piφ˙
)
.
We say that π is sound5 if, moreover, N |= ∀λ∀φ ([λ]piφ→ φ).
A formula πˆ is a Λ-uniform provability predicate over T if T ⊢ πˆ ↔ ∃c π,
where π is a Λ-uniform proof predicate.
Moreover, the provability predicates are required to require a modicum of
good behaviour as captured in the following definition.
Definition 6.2. Let π be a Λ-uniform proof predicate over a theory T . We say
that π is normalized if it is provable in T that for every λ we have that every
λ-derivable formula has infinitely many λ-derivations and, whenever [c : λ]piφ
and [c : λ]piψ, it follows that φ = ψ; in other words, every derivation must be a
derivation of a single formula.
Modal formulas are linked to arithmetical ones via an arithmetic interpreta-
tion.
5Observe that for pi to be sound, we must have that T itself was already sound.
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Definition 6.3. An arithmetic interpretation is a function6 f : P→ S1ω.
If π is a Λ-uniform proof predicate over T , we denote by fpi the unique
extension of f such that fpi(p) = f(p) for every propositional variable p, fpi(⊥) =
⊥, fpi commutes with Booleans and fpi([λ]φ) = [λ]pifpi(φ).
The following uniform completeness theorem is proven in [17, Theorem 10.2]
and provides us with an easy way to prove completeness for our current inter-
pretation.
Theorem 6.4. If Λ is a computable linear order, T is any sound, representable
theory extending RCA0, π is a sound, normalized, Λ-uniform proof predicate
over T and φ is any L-formula, GLPΛ ⊢ φ if and only if, for every arithmetic
interpretation f , T ⊢ fpi(φ).
6.2 Arithmetical completeness for Mu¨nchhausen provabil-
ity
We can now combine the results from this paper and the previous subsection to
see that under some extra conditions we obtain arithmetical completeness for
one-Mu¨nchhausen provability.
Theorem 6.5 (Arithmetical Completeness). Let Λ be a computable linear or-
der, T is any sound, representable one-Mu¨nchhausen theory extending RCA0
with corresponding provability predicate [α]T
Λ
ϕ so that T ⊢ IΣ01([α]T
Λ
ϕ). We
then have that [α]T
Λ
ϕ is a uniform provability predicate and in particular,
GLPΛ ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀ ∗ T ⊢ ϕ
∗.
Proof. As always, the ∗ in the statement of the theorem is understood to range
over arithmetical interpretations that map propositional variables to arbitrary
sentences, so that ∗ commutes with the boolean connectives and each modal
formula [α]ψ is mapped to [α]T
Λψ∗.
From our provability predicate (omitting sub and superscripts) [α]ϕ we will
define a proof predicate π(c, λ, φ) for which we will observe that over T it is a
normalized uniform proof predicate so that provably ∃c π(c, λ, φ) ↔ [λ]φ. To
this end we define
π(c, λ, φ) := c = 〈c0, c1〉∧


(
c0 = 0 ∧ ProofT (c1, φ)
)
∨(
c0 = 1 ∧ c1 = 〈ξ, ψ, p〉 ∧ ξ ≺ λ ∧
〈ξ〉ψ ∧ ProofT (p, 〈ξ〉
ψ → φ)
)
.
It is straightforward to see that, indeed, T ⊢ ∃c π(c, λ, φ) ↔ [λ]φ. Since
ProofT is a normalized proof predicate, so is π. Thus, we should only check
6By P we denote the set of propositional variables and by S1ω we denote the set of Π
1
ω
sentences.
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Properties 1 – 7 from Definition 6.1. Property 1 is one of the assumptions of
the theorem and Properties 2, 3 and 7 follow directly from the arithmetical
soundness of one-Mu¨nchhausen provability. Property 4 follows since T is a
one-Mu¨nchhausen theory whence proves transitivity of ≺. Properties 5 and 6
are a direct consequence of the definition of π and the soundness of the one-
Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate.
7 Some notes on the Formalisation of one-Mu¨nchhausen
provability
Throughout this paper we have been talking about Mu¨nchhausen provability
predicates and proving all sorts of properties of them. The reserved reader may
now question whether there exist one-Mu¨nchhausen theories with corresponding
one-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicates at all. In this section we sketch how to
formalize a Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate in second order arithmetic.
Just as in [17] we start our formalization by reserving a set parameter X
where we will collect all the pairs 〈α, ϕ〉 of ordinals α and formulas ϕ so that [α]ϕ
holds. Next, we will write down a predicate that all and only the correct pairs
〈α, ϕ〉 are in X . Thus, we write the recursion for one-Mu¨nchhausen provability
replacing every occurrence of [α]ϕ by 〈α, ϕ〉 ∈ X and consequently replacing
〈α〉ϕ by 〈α,¬ϕ〉 /∈ X . We define any set satisfying our predicate to be an
1−IMC for Iterated one-Mu¨nchhausen Class.
By naively doing so, a problem arises namely that we get occurrences of the
set variable X under the regular provability predicate T . By using numerals
we can speak under a box about numbers that ‘live outside the box’. However,
we do not have any syntactical artefact to denote arbitrary sets. A possibly way
out here would be to resort to oracle-provability as introduced in [10]. Thus, for
one-Mu¨nchhausen provability, the predicate would look something like:
1−IMC(X,α) :=
∀ ξ≤α ∀ϕ
[
〈ξ, ϕ〉 ∈ X ↔
(
Tϕ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ ζ<ξ ( 〈ζ,¬ψ〉 /∈ X ∧
T |X(〈ζ,¬ψ〉 /∈ X → ϕ))
)]
.
With such a predicate we can then define:
[α]T,1ϕ := ∀X
(
1−IMC(X,α)→ 〈α, ϕ〉 ∈ X
)
.
However, it is not clear if such a predicate will satisfy the required recursive
equation since the relation between oracle provability and regular provability is
not yet entirely understood in all its details.
For these and other reasons we choose a different approach. We will an-
ticipate that hopefully/probably the 1−IMC predicate will define a unique set.
Then, under the box we can just use any set that satisfies IMC(X). Of course,
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the fixpoint theorem allows us to do so. In the formalisation of Mu¨nchhausen
provability we will closely follow [17]. As such we allow ourselves to be rather
sketchy and refer to [17] for the details.
Definition 7.1. We define the predicate 1−IMC(X, γ) using the fixpoint theo-
rem so that it satisfies (provably in ECA0) the following recursion.
1−IMC (X, γ) ←→(
∀αγ ∀ϕ
[
〈α, ϕ〉 ∈ X ↔
Uϕ ∨ ∃β≺α∃ψ
(
〈β,¬ψ〉 /∈ X∧
U [∃X(1−IMC(X, β˙) ∧ 〈β˙,¬ψ˙〉 /∈ X)→ ϕ]
)])
With this Iterated one-Mu¨nchhausen Class predicate we define our one-Mu¨nchhausen
predicate as
[α]Uϕ := ∀X
(
1−IMC(X,α)→ 〈α, ϕ〉 ∈ X
)
.
It is clear that our definition supposes that we fix an ordinal notation system
for some ordinal Λ and that all our ordinal quantifications are restricted to this
Λ. We observe that
〈α〉ϕ := ∃X
(
1−IMC(X,α) ∧ 〈α,¬ϕ〉 /∈ X
)
.
Consequently we can rewrite the defining recursion for Iterated one-Mu¨nchhausen
Classes as
1−IMC (X, γ) ←→(
∀αγ ∀ϕ
[
〈α, ϕ〉 ∈ X ↔
Uϕ ∨ ∃β≺α∃ψ(〈β,¬ψ〉 /∈ X∧
U [〈β〉ψ → ϕ])
])
.
It is clear that 1−IMC depends on the base theory U and on the ordinal rep-
resentation Λ but for the sake of readability we suppress these dependencies in
our notation. We remark that 1−IMC(X, γ) is of complexity Π02 with free set
variable X . Our predicate [α]ϕ has a universal quantifier ranging over all sets
that are iterated Mu¨nchhausen classes. Of course, we would hope that indeed
such classes are uniquely defined if they exists at all.
In order to express this, we will fix the following notation
X ≡α Y := ∀βα ∀ϕ
(
〈β, ϕ〉 ∈ X ←→ 〈β, ϕ〉 ∈ Y
)
,
and
∃≤1X IMC(X,α) := ∀X ∀Y
(
IMC(X,α) ∧ IMC(Y, α) −→ X ≡α Y
)
.
We can now state and prove a key ingredient in proving that our formalisation
satisfies the defining recursion for Mu¨nchhausen provability.
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Lemma 7.2. Let U be a theory extending ECA0. We have that
ACA0 + wo(α) ⊢ ∀α ∃
≤1X IMC(X,α).
Proof. We prove by transfinite induction that IMC(X,α)∧IMC(Y, α)→ X ≡α Y
where X and Y are unbounded set variables. Note that this is an arithmetical
formula so that ACA0 can prove transfinite induction up to α for this formula
since we assumed wo(α).
Now that we have uniqueness we proceed as in [17, Theorem 4.3] to observe
that we actually may perform transfinite induction for second order formulas as
long as the second order formulas are restricted to the IMCs.
Theorem 7.3. Given a formula θ(X) ∈ Π1ω,
ACA0 ⊢ ∀Λ
(
∃≤1X θ(X) ∧ wo(Λ)→ TI(Λ,Π1ω ↾ θ)
)
.
We are now ready to prove that our formalisation satisfies the required re-
cursion.
Theorem 7.4. Let T be any presentable theory extending ECA0. We have
ACA0 + wo(β) + ∃X1−IMC(X, β) ⊢ ∀αβ
[
[α]Tϕ ↔ Tϕ ∨ ∃ψ ∃ γ
(
γ ≺ α∧
〈γ〉Tψ ∧
T (〈γ〉Tψ → ϕ)
)]
.
Proof. By transfinite induction on α as in [17]. Note that we need the existence
of a 1−IMC for the→ direction. By Theorem 7.3 we have access to the transfinite
induction in ACA0 since we proved uniqueness for 1−IMC’s.
8 Weakening the base theory: Mu¨nchhausen prov-
ability
In this paper we have introduced the notion of one-Mu¨nchhausen provability
for which we have proven arithmetical sound and completeness. Furthermore,
we have shown in Theorem 7.4 that the notion can be formalised in second
order arithmetic. However, the theory where the formalisation takes place is
quite strong. In particular, it requires a fair amount of transfinite induction.
As pointed out, this prove theoretic strength is consequently also required in
the object theory which is not desirable. Via various tricks, one can lower the
required proof theoretic strength of the object and meta-theory. A first step in
doing so is via the introduction of Mu¨nchhausen provability. Further tricks are
presented and worked out in [26].
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To define Mu¨nchhausen provability we will start out with a very similar but
slightly different recursion equivalence:
[α]⊠T ϕ ↔ Tϕ ∨ ∃σ ∃ τ
(
|σ|= |τ | ∧ ∀ i<|τ | τi≺α ∧ ∀ i<|σ| 〈τi〉
⊠
T σ(i)
∧ T (∀ i<|σ| 〈τi〉
⊠
T σ(i) → ϕ)
)
. (14)
In this recursive equivalence we understand that σ is a finite sequence of formulas
with |σ| denoting the length of the sequence and σ(i) denoting the ith element
of the sequence. Likewise, τ is understood as being a sequence of ordinals all
bounded by α. We will write either τ(i) or τi for the ith element of τ . Moreover,
〈α〉⊠ is as always to be read a shorthand for ¬[α]⊠¬.
One of the main complications in proving the arithmetical soundness of
one-Mu¨nchhausen provability in the previous section was in the proof of the
closure of provability under conjunctions that is, [α]ϕ ∧ [α]ψ ↔ [α](ϕ ∧ ψ).
The proof of this required a weak closure of consistency under conjunctions –
∀ϕ, ψ ∃χ
(
〈α〉ϕ∧〈α〉ψ ↔ 〈α〉χ
)
– so that the conjunction of two oracle sentences
could be conceived as a single oracle sentence. However, in the new recursive
equivalence as we just defined in (14), the closure of oracles under conjunctions
is built into the definition.
A further complication in proving the arithmetical soundness of one-Mu¨nch-
hausen provability in the previous sections was caused by the fact that weak
closure under conjunctions of consistency needed to be verified under a box.
This was obtained by requiring a fair amount of transfinite induction and by
requiring that the object and meta-theory be equal. In this last section we shall
see that these requirements can also be circumvented.
The defining equation (14) begs for a notational simplification. From now
on, the greek letter σ shall be reserved to denote sequences of formulas and
the greek letter τ shall be reserved to denote sequences of ordinals. As such,
we settle upon the notational convention that τ ≺ α is short for ∀ i<|τ | τi≺α
and 〈τ〉⊠T σ is short for |σ|= |τ | ∧ ∀ i<|σ| 〈τi〉
⊠
T σ(i). Since we shall require that
provably |σ|= |τ |→ T |σ|= |τ |, the defining recursion can be recasted as
[α]⊠T ϕ ↔ Tϕ ∨ ∃σ ∃ τ≺α
(
〈τ〉⊠T σ ∧ T (〈τ〉
⊠
T σ → ϕ)
)
. (15)
Although we still cannot prove that different predicates that provably sat-
isfy (15) are provably equivalent, at least proving soundness of GLPΛ for such
predicates becomes an easy matter. Let us first define some important notions
as before but now for Mu¨nchhausen provability instead of one-Mu¨nchhausen
provability.
Definition 8.1. Let us call a theory T a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory whenever we
can define a predicate [α]⊠T
Λ
so that T proves (15) together with
T ⊢ “≺ is transitive, right-discrete and has a minimal element”,
T ⊢ (ξ ≺ ζ)→ [ζ]⊠T
Λ
(ξ ≺ ζ),
ξ < ζ < Λ implies T ⊢ ξ ≺ ζ.
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Moreover, it is understood that T has a simple coding machinery for finite se-
quence of objects so that the obvious facts about length and concatenation prov-
ably hold. For example, T ⊢ |τ |= n→ T |τ |= n, etc.
In this case we call [α]⊠T
Λ
a T (Λ)-Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate.
When the theory T and ordinal Λ are clear from the context, we shall simply
speak of a Mu¨nchhausen theory and of a Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate. On
occasion we might only mention the ordinal Λ or only the theory T and speak
of, for example, a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory and a T -Mu¨nchhausen provability
predicate respectively. As with one-Mu¨nchhausen provability we see that the
interaction axioms become trivial to prove for any Mu¨nchhausen provability
predicate. In what follows we will revisit and simplify the soundness proof.
Lemma 8.2. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding predicate
[α]⊠T
Λ
. Omitting sub and superscripts, we have that
1. T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ∀β≺α≺Λ ([β]⊠ϕ→ [α]⊠ϕ),
2. T ⊢ ∀α ∀ϕ∀β≺α≺Λ (〈β〉⊠ϕ→ [α]⊠〈β〉⊠ϕ), and more in general
3. T ⊢ ∀α ∀σ ∀ τ≺α≺Λ (〈τ〉⊠σ → [α]⊠〈τ〉⊠σ).
Proof. The proof is straightforward and completely analogous to the proof of
Lemma 5.3. Let us just shortly comment on the second item. So, we reason
in T and pick a formula ϕ and ordinals α and β as indicated, assuming 〈β〉⊠ϕ.
We now consider the sequence σϕ of length 1 whose only element is the formula
ϕ. Likewise, we consider the sequence τβ of length 1 whose only element is the
ordinal β. Clearly, T ⊢ 〈τβ〉
⊠σϕ → 〈β〉
⊠ϕ so that [α]⊠〈β〉⊠ϕ follows.
Contrary to the case of 1-Mu¨nchhausen provability it becomes now an easy
exercise to see that each (internally quantified) provability predicate satisfies
the distribution axioms for the basic modal logic K. Moreover, necessitation
is also a routine matter. Before we prove this, we first need a technical easy
lemma similar to Lemma 5.1 whose proof is immediate.
Lemma 8.3. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding predicate
[α]⊠T
Λ
. Again, omitting sub and superscripts, we have that
U ⊢ ∀α≺Λ ∀ϕ, ψ, χ
(
[α]⊠ψ ∧ϕ ∧(ϕ ∧ ψ → ξ) → [α]⊠ξ
)
.
With this technical lemma at hand it becomes very easy to see that each
Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate [α]⊠T
Λ
defines a normal7 modal logic.
7It is in this lemma that we see that working with a single β would not have worked
directly. That is, if we had defined [α]⊠
T
ϕ ↔ Tϕ ∨ ∃σ ∃β≺α
(
∀ i<|σ| 〈β〉⊠
T
σ(i) ∧
T (∀ i<|σ| 〈β〉
⊠
T σ(i) → ϕ)
)
. The distributivity axiom can then only be proved if we can
work with the largest consistency statement. Thus, something like Lemma 2.4.2 should be
available. For that, the soundness of GLPβ would be needed and we are back at the transfinite
induction template again.
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Lemma 8.4. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding predicate
[α]⊠T
Λ
. Again, omitting sub and superscripts, we have that
1. T ⊢ ∀α≺Λ ∀ϕ, ∀ψ
(
[α]⊠(ϕ→ ψ) → ([α]⊠ϕ→ [α]⊠ψ)
)
, and
2. for any ordinal α below Λ, if T ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ [α]⊠ϕ.
Proof. The proof of the second item is easy and identical to the proof Lemma
5.4. It is in the first item where we see that working with sequences of formulas
instead of formulas in our oracles is essential. So, let us reason in T and fix α
and ϕ as stated. We assume [α]⊠(ϕ→ ψ) and [α]⊠ϕ and need to prove [α]⊠ψ.
The case that both (ϕ→ ψ) and ϕ hold is trivial and in case one of them
holds, Lemma 8.3 provides a proof.
So, in the remaining and only non-trivial case, we find two pairs of sequences
σϕ with τϕ and σϕ→ψ with τϕ→ψ so that τϕ ≺ α∧〈τϕ〉σϕ ∧ (〈τϕ〉σϕ → ϕ) and
also τϕ→ψ ≺ α∧〈τϕ→ψ〉σϕ→ψ ∧ 
(
〈τϕ→ψ〉σϕ→ψ → (ϕ→ ψ)
)
. We now consider
the concatenation τϕ ⋆τϕ→ψ of both τ -sequences and likewise σϕ ⋆σϕ→ψ denotes
the concatenation of both σ-sequences. Clearly, we have |τϕ⋆τϕ→ψ|= |σϕ⋆σϕ→ψ|
and τϕ ⋆ τϕ→ψ ≺ α. Likewise, from our assumptions it is easy to observe that
〈τϕ ⋆ τϕ→ψ〉σϕ ⋆ σϕ→ψ and 
(
〈τϕ ⋆ τϕ→ψ〉σϕ ⋆ σϕ→ψ → ψ
)
so that indeed
[α]⊠ψ.
As a consequence of our previous lemmas, we know that all reasoning of the
modal logic K can be applied to any Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate. We
now turn to the transitivity axiom to conclude that each predicate [α]⊠ actually
is sound for K4. Before proving this, we need one easy technical observation.
Lemma 8.5. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding predicate
[α]⊠. We have that
T ⊢ ∃x [α]⊠ϕ(x˙) → [α]⊠∃xϕ(x).
Proof. We reason in T and assume that for some x we gave [α]⊠ϕ(x˙). Thus,
for some (possibly empty) σ and some ordinal β (less than α in case σ is non-
empty) we have 〈α〉⊠σ and (〈β〉⊠σ → ϕ(x˙)) whence also (〈β〉⊠σ → ∃xϕ(x))
as was to be shown.
We can now prove the soundness of the transitivity axiom.
Lemma 8.6. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory with corresponding predicate
[α]⊠. We have that
T ⊢ ∀α≺Λ ∀ϕ
(
[α]⊠ϕ → [α]⊠[α]⊠ϕ
)
.
Proof. The proof is very similar to Item 5 of Theorem 5.6 but now, there is
no need for induction since we already know our predicate to be sound for K
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reasoning. Thus, we reason in T , fix some ordinal α ≺ Λ and formula ϕ and
assume [α]⊠ϕ. Now either ϕ or there is some sequence of ordinals τ ≺ α and
sequence σ so that 〈β〉⊠σ and 
(
〈β〉⊠σ → ϕ
)
. In the first case, we get from
ϕ that ϕ whence by applying monotonicity twice that [α]⊠[α]⊠ϕ. Thus
we focus on the second case and fix a particular sequences τ and σ so that
1. τ ≺ α;
2. 〈τ〉⊠σ;
3. 
(
〈τ〉⊠σ → ϕ
)
.
From the first item, we get by assumptions on Mu¨nchhausen theories that
[α]⊠(τ ≺ α). From the second item we get by negative introspection that
[α]⊠〈τ〉⊠σ. From the third item we get
(
〈τ〉⊠σ → ϕ
)
whence [α]⊠
(
〈τ〉⊠σ →
ϕ
)
. Collecting these three consequences and applying provable closure of prov-
ability under conjunctions we obtain
∃σ∃τ [α]⊠
(
τ≺α ∧ 〈τ〉⊠σ ∧ (〈τ〉⊠σ → ϕ)
)
so that by Lemma 8.5 we conclude
[α]⊠∃σ ∃τ≺α
(
〈τ〉⊠σ ∧ (〈τ〉⊠σ → ϕ)
)
which implies [α]⊠[α]⊠ϕ as was to be shown.
In the light of Lemma 5.5 we may now conclude arithmetical soundness for
GLPΛ for Mu¨nchhausen provability.
Theorem 8.7. Let T be a Λ-Mu¨nchhausen theory and let [α]⊠T be a correspond-
ing Mu¨nchhausen provability predicate. Then, GLPΛ is sound for T when the
[α] -modalities (α ≺ Λ) are interpreted as [α]⊠T .
Proof. As always we prove by induction on a GLPΛ proof that if GLPΛ ⊢ ϕ,
then for any arithmetical realization ∗ we have that T ⊢ ϕ∗.
It is clear how the completeness proof and formalisation can be adapted to
the new provability notion. Actually, it seems that in a sense Mu¨nchhausen
provability is more fundamental than one-Mu¨nchhausen provability. We have
chosen to start this paper with one-Mu¨nchhausen provability instead for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the defining recursion for one-Mu¨nchhausen provability is slightly
easier and more perspicuous. But secondly, it is important to be aware of the
tension between provable properties and provable provable properties in the no-
tion of one-Mu¨nchhausen provability and how this tension can be mitigated via
transfinite reflexive induction.
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